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ABSTRACT 
Prior to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), state 
legislatures routinely passed laws requiring health insurance carriers to cover certain 
health care services or providers. At the behest of the insurance industry, Congress 
attempted to use the health reform law as a vehicle to reign in state-specific “mandated 
benefit” laws. That being said, the ACA does not prevent states from enacting 
mandated benefit laws; in fact, the statute expressly permits states to enact such laws. 
Instead, Congress created a significant barrier to continued state-specific regulation of 
health insurance benefits. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (Section 
1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Act) requires states to “defray” the cost of any mandated 
benefit that exceeds the federally defined “essential health benefits” (EHB) package. 
In other words, were a state to enact a mandated benefit law that requires coverage for 
a benefit or service not included in the EHB package, the state would be legally 
obligated to appropriate state general revenue to either the individual subscribers or 
health plans to cover the cost of that benefit. In an apparent attempt to forestall state 
level health insurance regulation, Congress exacted a financial penalty from states for 
performing their essential role as the primary regulator of the insurance industry. This 
article will explore the constitutional implications of this ACA innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n April 7, 2016, the New York Assembly Standing Committees on 
Insurance and Health held a public hearing to explore the “[state] 
legislative role in modernizing state health insurance coverage under the 
Affordable Care Act.”1 Prior to the passage of the ACA, such a hearing 
would not have been necessary because a state legislature’s role in 
modernizing state health insurance coverage was clear: enact laws 
requiring insurers to cover such benefits and services that the duly 
elected members of the legislature deem necessary to meet the needs of 
their constituents. The following passage from the Committees’ public 
hearing notice reflects a problem that state legislators across the country 
now face each time they consider mandated benefit legislation in the 
post-ACA world: 
The Affordable Care Act provided that states must pay 
the cost of new health insurance coverage “mandates” 
which were not included as [federal] “essential health 
benefits.” There has been almost no guidance to the state 
legislatures about what this means in practice.. . . In 
practice this means that health care coverage has 
become frozen as reflected in the 2012 essential health 
benefits.2 
Simply put, states now must appropriate state general revenue dollars to 
subsidize the cost of any newly enacted mandated benefits that exceed 
the essential health benefits package.3 
                                                          
1 The Legislative Role in Modernizing State Health Insurance Coverages under the 
Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the Joint Assembly Standing Committees on 
Insurance and Health, 2015-2016 Regular Sessions (NY 2016) (Public Hearing 
Notice), http://assembly.state.ny.us/write/upload/publichearing/20160318.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TXS2-EAHQ] [hereinafter NY Assembly Hearing Notice]. 
2 Id. (emphasis added). 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). See also CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. 
& INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULL., 1, 9 (Dec.16, 2011), 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/essential_health_benef
its_bulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6TT-X8UA] [hereinafter EHB Bulletin] 
(“Section 1311(d)(3)(B) of the Affordable Care Act requires States to defray the 
costs of State-mandated benefits in excess of EHB for individuals enrolled in any 
qualified health plan either in the individual market or in the small group 
market.”). 
O 
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State legislators are often confronted with constituents facing 
thousands of dollars in medical bills for treatments that work, but are 
not covered by their insurance plans.4 Prior to the ACA enactment, state 
lawmakers needed only to consider a mandated benefit bill on its policy 
merits—hardly an easy task—to address these constituent concerns.5 
Now, in addition to evaluating competing policy considerations, 
legislators also must consider the state fiscal impact of mandated benefit 
legislation.6 
Because general revenue dollars are scarce and in high demand,7 the 
ACA has created a significant impediment to state lawmakers’ ability 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., H. Finance Comm. Hearing on S.B. 791, S.D. 1, H.D. 1, Relating to 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, 2015 Regular Session, 28th Leg. 179 (Haw. 2015) 
(written testimony of Michael Saines) 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2015/testimony/SB791_HD1_TESTIMO
NY_FIN_04-08-15_.pdf (indicating that family had “been paying out of pocket 
medical expenses averaging over $20,000 a year for [applied behavior analysis] 
services, speech therapy, and extra tutoring on top of regular medical bills). See 
also id. (“[W]e are at our limits financially and there are many other families who 
can’t afford basic services at all. This bill [requiring insurance coverage for autism 
spectrum disorders treatment] would give our children at very least, access to the 
same services that other insurers are offering in Hawaii.”). 
5 See infra Part I.B.1. 
6 See John Carroll, States May Yet Regret Their Many Mandates, MANAGED CARE 
MAGAZINE (March 2011), 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2011/3/states-may-yet-regret-their-
many-mandates [https://perma.cc/WS8C-JKX6] (“It used to be that legislators 
would consider new mandates without any consideration of who winds up paying. 
Now [lawyer-lobbyist Keith Stover] says, ‘there will be a price for this.’”). 
7 See, e.g., National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of 
States: An Update on State Fiscal Conditions: Spring 2016, VII, 
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2db1-c943-4f1b-
b750-
0fca152d64c2/UploadedImages/Reports/Spring%202016%20Fiscal%20Survey
%20of%20States-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5P2-LBUQ] (“While state budget 
conditions have significantly improved and largely stabilized since the tough 
years during and immediately following the Great Recession, states across the 
country continue to face fiscal challenges in the short and long terms. Spending 
requirements on K-12 education, health care, and other critical areas continue to 
grow, often faster than state revenues.”); Kil Huh & Sarah Babbage, Long Term 
Obligations Vary as a Share of State Resources, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
(May 17, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/analysis/2016/05/17/long-term-obligations-vary-as-a-share-of-state-
resources [https://perma.cc/6UAG-R7QV] (“[States] still face some long-term 
spending commitments–such as debt and unfunded retirement costs–that they 
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to respond to their constituents’ needs vis-à-vis health benefits. As the 
committee chairman noted in his opening remarks at the aforementioned 
New York legislative committee hearing: “In essence, health treatments 
and practices have been frozen at the level, the technology and protocols 
that were in the benchmark plans selected in 2012 . . . despite ongoing 
advances in health care. The legislature must have the ability to require 
new health coverages . . . .”8 
By exacting a financial penalty from states for merely performing 
their role as the health insurance industry’s primary regulator, this 
article argues that this ACA innovation “commandeers” the states’ 
legislative processes in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Part I of this 
Article provides relevant substantive background information on the 
ACA and the current balance of federal-state health insurance 
regulation. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s preeminent 
commandeering cases—New York v. U.S. and Printz v. U.S. Part III 
demonstrates that this ACA provision falls within the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s prohibition on federal commandeering of state 
lawmaking. Part III argues that Congress has provided states with a false 
choice—either regulate health benefits “according to Congress’ 
instructions”9 or risk losing scarce state general revenue dollars to a 
congressionally mandated state subsidy to the insurance industry. Part 
IV reviews (i) judicial and legislative options to bring this ACA section 
back into conformity with prevailing Constitutional norms and (ii) 
existing state options to avoid triggering the “defray the cost” provision. 
                                                          
must reckon with in the future. In 2013, states reported that they owed $968 billion 
in unfunded pension benefits. . .States also reported $587 billion in unfunded 
retiree health care liabilities . . . .”). 
8 The Legislative Role in Modernizing State Health Insurance Coverages under the 
Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the Joint Assembly Standing Committees on 
Insurance and Health, 2015-2016 Regular Sessions 6 (NY 2016) (statement of 
Assembly Member Kevin Cahill, Chair, Assembly Standing Committee on 
Insurance) 
http://nystateassembly.granicus.com/MinutesViewer.php?view_id=8&clip_id=3
191&doc_id=ec712e4e-12e3-11e6-b3ab-00219ba2f017 [https://perma.cc/47NH-
R69J]. 
9 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
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PART I. BACKGROUND 
A. Historic Roles of Federal and State Government in Health 
Insurance Regulation 
State governments have historically served as the primary regulator 
of the insurance industry.10 Insurance regulation has long been 
understood to be within states’ “historic police powers.”11 However, in 
U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the business of insurance fell within the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.12 After this 1944 decision, Congress acted swiftly to 
restore state primacy in insurance regulation.13 With the enactment of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945, Congress declared “that the 
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business 
of insurance is in the public interest . . . .”14 Moreover, “[n]o Act of 
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance.”15 
On its face, the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to give 
considerable deference to state governments in regulating the insurance 
industry.16 However, by preserving Congress’ ability to enact laws 
“specifically relat[ing] to the business of insurance,” the statute 
implicitly recognizes the essential holding of South-Eastern 
Underwriters, that in a modern economy, the business of insurance 
                                                          
10 Joshua Phares Ackerman, The Unintended Federalism Consequences of the 
Affordable Care Act’s Insurance Market Reforms, 34 PACE L. REV. 273, 278-80 
(2014); Meghan S. Stubblebine, Note, The Federal Medical Loss Ratio: A 
Permissible Federal Regulation or an Encroachment on State Power?, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 341, 354 (2013). 
11 Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, 143 Cal. App. 4th 526, 536-37 (2nd Dist., 
2006) (quoting Smith v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1475 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). See also 44 C.J.S. Insurance §36 (2016). 
12 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (holding “No 
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines 
has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.”). 
13 Ackerman, supra note 10, at 280-81. 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
16 See id. 
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impacts interstate commerce and is therefore subject to federal 
regulation via the Commerce Clause.17 Accordingly, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act is no impediment to congressional acts which specifically 
intend to regulate the business of insurance.18 Congress has used its 
authority to directly regulate the health insurance market on many 
occasions since McCarran-Ferguson’s passage, most recently and 
dramatically with the ACA in 2010.19 
B. Federal vs. State Regulation 
1. State Mandated Benefit Laws 
In exercising their traditional role as the primary insurance industry 
regulator, states have regulated the content of health insurance policies 
for several decades.20 States began enacting mandated benefit laws in 
the 1970s.21 To counter insurers’ attempts to manage costs by limiting 
services available to consumers, state legislatures enacted mandated 
benefit laws “by the hundreds.”22 States have enacted mandated benefit 
laws to require coverage for a wide variety of treatments and services, 
including but not limited to: treatment of autism spectrum disorders,23 
diabetes,24 alcoholism and substance abuse disorders,25 and infertility 
                                                          
17 See Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An 
Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 
1364 (2007) [hereinafter Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free 
Market?] (“However, section 1012(b) of the Act specifically provides that 
Congress may preempt state insurance law by specifically stating that federal 
legislation is intended to apply to the business of insurance.”). 
18 See id. (noting that, with respect to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, “Congress 
therefore retains the ability to regulate insurance so long as it makes its intentions 
explicit.”). 
19 See infra Part I.C. 
20 Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra note 17, at 
1365. 
21 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 728 n. 3 (noting that the 
“first mandated benefit statutes. . .appeared in 1971 and 1972 . . . .”). 
22 Russell Korobkin, The Battle Over Self-Insured Health Plans, or ‘One Good 
Loophole Deserves Another’, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. ETHICS 89, 96-97 
(2005). 
23 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.73. 
24 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.2 (2016). 
25 See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/370c (2016). 
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treatment.26 All in all, there were approximately 1,600 state mandated 
benefit laws in effect at the time the ACA was enacted.27   
Mandated benefit laws have long been controversial.28 Insurers 
argue that these laws increase costs and limit consumer choice.29 Others 
object to mandated benefit laws as inappropriately interfering with 
freedom of contract.30 Meanwhile, consumer advocates and other 
proponents of state content regulation contend that mandated benefit 
laws are needed to combat market inefficiencies and adverse selection.31 
Whatever the pros and cons of state-specific mandated benefit laws may 
be, it is clear that mandated benefits were commonplace throughout the 
United States at the time the ACA was enacted.32 Moreover, it is 
apparent that mandated benefit laws and other state-specific insurance 
regulatory schemes have impacted employers’ decision-making related 
to health and other benefits.33 
2. ERISA and the Limits of State Authority to Regulate Health 
Benefits 
As its title indicates, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted originally to provide minimum 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (2017). 
27 EHB Bulletin, supra note 3, at 7. 
28 Amy B. Monahan, The ACA, the Large Group Market, and Content Regulation: 
What’s a State To Do?, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 83, 89 (2011) 
[hereinafter Monahan, The ACA, the Large Group Market, and Content 
Regulation]. 
29 See, e.g., AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, STATEMENT ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH 
BENEFITS: SUBMITTED TO INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON THE 
DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS, 9 (Jan. 13, 2011), 
https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Health
Services/EssentialHealthBenefits/2011-JAN-
13%20and%2014/Carmella%20Bocchino%20Statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4DH-X7HA] (arguing that “the inclusion of [state] mandates 
in the essential health benefits package is likely to have a significant impact on 
access to affordable coverage and limiting consumer choice.”). 
30 See Amy Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content 
Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 149-50 (2012) [hereinafter Monahan, 
Fairness Versus Welfare]. 
31 See id. at 148-49. 
32 See supra text accompanying notes 19-27. 
33 Cf. Korobkin, supra note 22, at 97, 107-09 (noting that employers’ “desire to 
avoid state benefits mandates and premium taxes can explain at least some of this 
increase in popularity [of opting to self-insure].”). 
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protections to employees participating in private pension plans.34 That 
being said, ERISA’s scope is broader than its title indicates. The statute 
governs all employee benefits, including health benefits.35 Most 
importantly for the purposes of this limited exploration of ERISA, the 
statute “supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”36 While ERISA protects 
state laws governing insurance from preemption,37 the statute 
effectively bars states from regulating a substantial portion of employee 
benefit plans.38 
Employers that provide health benefits to their employees generally 
fall into two categories, fully–insured and self–insured (or self–funded). 
In a fully–insured arrangement, the employer purchases health 
insurance from an insurance carrier, and the carrier assumes the 
financial risk of providing the benefits.39 In contrast, the employer 
generally assumes the financial risk for claims incurred in a self–insured 
arrangement.40 
                                                          
34 See 29 U.S.C § 1001(c) (2012) (“It is hereby further declared to be the policy of 
this chapter to protect . . . the interests of participants in private pension plans and 
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such 
[private pension] plans . . . .”). See also Daniel W. Sherrick, ERISA Preemption: 
An Introduction, 64 MICH. B. J. 1074, 1074 (1985) (“Faced with the rapid growth 
of private pension and benefit plans and the inability of the states to develop a 
comprehensive and uniform governing body of law, Congress enacted ERISA in 
1974.”). 
35 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012) (“The terms ‘employee welfare benefit plan’ and 
‘welfare plan’ mean any plan, fund or program . . . to the extent that such plan, 
fund or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for 
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the 
event of sickness, accident, disability, death . . . .”). 
36 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
37 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
38 Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra note 17, at 
1371. 
39 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NAT’L COMPENSATION SURVEY: GLOSSARY OF 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TERMS (Apr. 2016), 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/glossary20152016.htm#health_care 
[https://perma.cc/HR8J-PHW3]. 
40 Id. Employers assume varying levels of risk in self-funded arrangements. “Stop-
loss” insurance policies allow self-funded employers to limit their risk exposure. 
Some have characterized the ability of employers to purchase stop-loss insurance 
as a “loophole” in ERISA’s preemption of state insurance regulation. See 
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As alluded to above, ERISA bars states from categorizing self-
funded health benefit plans as “insurance” for the purpose of subjecting 
them to state regulation.41 Thus ERISA’s application results in a 
complicated regulatory system for benefits that the average employee 
considers to be his or her “health insurance.”42 Simply put, fully-insured 
health benefit plans are subject to state-specific regulation while self-
funded plans are not.43 Moreover, ERISA does not regulate the content 
of self–funded plans in any significant way.44 As one commentator 
noted, “self-insured plans operate rather happily in a ‘regulatory 
void.’”45 
Considering the significant benefits of self-insuring–namely 
avoiding state-specific regulation, mandated benefit laws, and premium 
                                                          
Korobkin, supra note 22, at 91 (“[T]he number [of self-funded plans] is 
surprisingly high, owing in part to the popularity of a loophole in ERISA that 
enables employers without sufficient resources to bear the risk of their employees’ 
health care costs to purchase ‘stop-loss’ insurance . . . and still qualify for 
ERISA’s protection from state regulatory requirements.”). 
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012) (“Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor 
any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance 
company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be 
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any 
State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust 
companies, or investment companies.”). See also Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 
111 F. 3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Thus, a preempted law is saved from 
preemption if it regulates insurance and does not deem ERISA plans to be insurers 
for purposes of the state regulation of insurance.”). 
42 Cf. Korobkin, supra note 22, at 93 (“Thus, ERISA preserves the traditional right 
of states to regulate the insurance industry, but those regulations may not extend 
to cover [employer health care benefits plans], even though [employer health care 
benefits plans] often serve an insurance function and might otherwise find 
themselves subject to state laws governing insurance.”). 
43 See Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 30, at 147 (“The end result of 
this regulatory structure is that individual insurance policies are regulated at the 
state level, insured employer plans are regulated both by the state and by ERISA, 
and self-insured employer plans are regulated solely by ERISA.”). 
44 See Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra note 17, 
at 1372 (“[Plans] that are self-insured are subject only to the limited substantive 
requirements of ERISA, while plans that are funded through insurance contracts 
are subject to state insurance laws (including mandated benefit provisions), as 
well as any substantive requirements of ERISA . . . .”). 
45 Id. 
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taxes46–along with the availability of stop-loss insurance,47 it is hardly 
surprising a significant portion of the market opts to self-fund.48 Some 
61% of employees receiving health benefits from their employers are in 
self–funded plans.49 Thus 61% of employees receive health benefits that 
are by and large exempted from state regulation.50 Indeed, the prospect 
of avoiding state-specific taxation and regulation appears to be a 
motivation for opting to self–fund for at least some employers.51 Thus, 
while states had traditionally acted as the primary regulator of the health 
insurance industry, the breadth of the ERISA preemption scheme has 
forestalled state–specific regulation of a majority of employer–
sponsored health benefit plans.52 
C. State Authority to Regulate Health Insurance After the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
1. The Affordable Care Act 
Perhaps the most comprehensive expression of Congress’ intent to 
enact a law “specifically relate[d] to the business of insurance”53 in 
recent memory is the ACA. According to President Obama, Congress 
passed the ACA because its “leaders . . . recognized that expanding 
coverage, reducing the level and growth of health care costs, and 
                                                          
46 While state taxes on insurance premiums are generally not applicable to self-
funded plans, state legislatures have looked for creative ways to generate revenue 
from self-insured employer plans that are, to date, permissible under ERISA. See, 
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §550.1731 et seq. 
47 See generally Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra 
note 17, at 1372-73. 
48 See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2016 ANNUAL 
SURVEY, 188 (2016), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-
Benefits-2016-Annual-Survey [https://perma.cc/7B2G-9S5M]. 
49 Id. 
50 See Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 30, at 147. 
51 See generally Korobkin, supra note 22, at 107-09. 
52 See Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra note 17, 
at 1401 (discussing the “impotent role states currently play [in regulating health 
benefits] due to ERISA preemption . . . .”). See also Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. 
Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. 
L. & MED. 395, 399 (2005) (“With respect to many issues where states see 
regulation as appropriate, self-insured plans are simply unregulated.”). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
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improving quality was an urgent national priority.”54 Throughout its 900 
pages, the ACA seeks to increase the number of individuals with health 
insurance and reduce the cost of care.55 Among the ACA reforms were 
the two provisions at issue in NFIB v. Sebelius: the requirement for 
individuals to purchase health insurance (the “individual mandate”)56 
and the expansion of the Medicaid program.57 In addition, the Act 
requires insurers to “accept every employer and individual in the State 
that applies” for health insurance coverage regardless of an individual’s 
health status.58 The health reform law requires the creation of health 
insurance “exchanges,” which are online marketplaces designed to 
“facilitate the purchase of qualified health plans.”59 Finally, the Act 
provides tax credits to individuals at specified income levels to assist in 
covering the cost of health insurance.60 
2. Essential Health Benefits 
The ACA requires carriers offering health insurance to small 
employers and individuals61 to include “essential health benefits” 
                                                          
54 Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date and Next 
Steps, J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N. (Aug. 2, 2016) 
http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2533698 
[https://perma.cc/KVR3-C62Q]. 
55 Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
56 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012)). 
57 Id. at 2581-82 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2012)). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
60 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012)). 
61 The mandate to cover EHBs applies to individual and small employer plans 
regardless of whether the plan is purchased on or off of a health insurance 
exchange. See EHB Bulletin, supra note 3, at 1, n. 1 (“Self-insured group health 
plans, health insurance coverage offered in the large group market, and 
grandfathered health plans are not required to cover the essential health benefits.). 
See also Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief: Essential Health Benefits, 
HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2 (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_68.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/67SS-NSXU] (“Beginning in 2014 health plans sold in the 
individual and small group markets, both within and outside the new state-based 
exchanges, must include essential health benefit . . . . These requirements do not 
apply to self-insured health plans, those in the large group market . . . or 
grandfathered health plans . . . .”). 
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(EHB) in their plans.62 The Act identifies ten broad categories of 
benefits63 the plans must include and directs the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to further define the specific benefits insurers 
must offer via regulation.64 
The extent to which the Secretary would further define the EHB 
package was a high-stakes decision for the Obama Administration as it 
began implementing the ACA.65 If the regulations implementing the 
EHB requirements were too prescriptive, administration critics’ 
arguments that the ACA “[forced] a one-size-fits-all standard for health 
insurance and usurp[ed] state authority to regulate the industry” could 
have been bolstered.66 However, if the regulations were not prescriptive 
enough, consumer groups that had championed the ACA would have 
been disappointed.67 
                                                          
62 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6 (2012). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) provides “the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] 
shall define the essential health benefits, except that such benefits shall include at 
least the following general categories and the items and services covered within 
the categories: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency services; (3) 
hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health and substance 
use disorder services including behavioral health treatment; (6) prescription 
drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory 
services; (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; 
and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care.” 
64 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (2012). The statute further requires that “The Secretary 
shall ensure that the scope of [essential health] benefits . . . is equal to the scope 
of benefits provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the 
Secretary.” 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
65 See Noam M. Levey, Passing the Buck – Or Empowering States? Who Will Define 
Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFFAIRS 31:4, 663, 663-64 (Apr. 2012) 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/4/663 [https://perma.cc/QP8Q-SJTH] 
(“It is hard to overstate how important the notion of an essential health benefit 
package was to congressional Democrats and patient advocates as the law was 
being formulated.”). 
66 Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, NY TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/health/policy/health-care-law-to-
allow-states-to-pick-benefits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z72M-G3FC]. See 
Levey, supra note 65, at 663 (stating the Administration’s approach to defining 
EHBs “dodg[ed] another noxious debate about a federal government ‘takeover’ 
of the health care and health insurance system.”). 
67 See Jason Millman, A Fine Line on Essential Benefits, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/12/first-crack-at-essential-benefits-dodges-
backlash-070616 [https://perma.cc/L6XJ-J6S2] (“[C]onsumer groups, who see 
the extension of comprehensive insurance coverage as health reform’s most 
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Not surprisingly, interested parties had conflicting visions of what 
the EHB regulations should seek to accomplish.68 For instance, the 
insurance industry saw the EHB requirements as an opportunity to 
provide a uniform regulatory standard for insurers rather than a 
patchwork of state mandated benefit regulations.69 Further, America’s 
Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the leading health insurance industry 
trade association, saw no need to further specify the EHB package’s 
scope beyond what the statute provided.70 AHIP also believed this 
national standard could help insurers “get out from under” the weight of 
hundreds of state mandated benefit laws.71 In contrast, consumer 
advocates felt the EHB regulations needed to be detailed and strong in 
order to ensure the Act’s promise of providing comprehensive health 
coverage to consumers.72 For their part, state government 
representatives sought to ensure the EHB requirements would not 
interfere with the ability of state governments to regulate the insurance 
industry in their respective states.73 
                                                          
important promise, have been pushing for specific essential benefit requirements 
from HHS.”). 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 69-73. 
69 See AMS. HEALTH INS. PLANS, NOW IS THE TIME FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM: A 
PROPOSAL TO ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL COVERAGE, AFFORDABILITY, QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT AND MARKET REFORM, 10 (December 2008) 
https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ComprehensiveReform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YP78-E3UH] [hereinafter AHIP, NOW IS THE TIME] (“To 
maintain affordability, the essential benefits plan should not be subject to varying 
and conflicting state benefit mandates.”). 
70 In a written statement to the Institutes of Medicine, AHIP noted the following: 
“Congress has already specified an appropriate set of ‘essential’ items or services 
that should be included in the essential health benefits package.” AMS. HEALTH 
INS. PLANS, STATEMENT ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS SUBMITTED TO THE 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON THE DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL 
HEALTH BENEFITS (January 13, 2011) [hereinafter AHIP, STATEMENT ON 
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS] 
https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/B2B9D09B787E468398384F
E879094981.ashx [https://perma.cc/U8UN-N6RF]. 
71 Levey, supra note 65, at 664. See also id. (noting that insurers “had looked to 
Washington to create a national standard of benefits and clear away a web of 
burdensome state benefit mandates.”). 
72 See Millman, supra note 67. 
73 See Healthcare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor 
and Pensions, 111th Cong. 2009 WL 1653827 (2009) (statement of Ray 
Scheppach, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Governors Ass’n) (“While states are supportive of 
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Ultimately, in drafting the EHB regulations, HHS provided states 
with a surprising degree of flexibility.74 Rather than specifically 
delineate each and every benefit and service insurers must cover, the 
agency adopted a “benchmark” approach whereby states would, by and 
large, be permitted to define the EHB package applicable in their 
respective insurance markets.75 According to the final rule, states have 
the option to designate one of four76 “typical employer plans” as the 
state’s benchmark plan.77 Thereafter, plans subject to the EHB 
requirements would have to cover the benefits and services – including 
state mandated benefits – that the benchmark plan covered.78 While 
                                                          
having the federal government establish certain insurance market reforms on such 
issues as guaranteed issue, health care reform should not diminish or impede the 
long-standing establishment of state regulation of health insurance.”). 
74 See Pear, supra note 66 (describing the EHB benchmark approach as “a major 
surprise”). 
75 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Standards Related to Essential 
Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,841 
(Feb. 25, 2013) (“The benchmark approach for defining EHB sought to balance 
the statutory ten benefit categories and affordability while providing states – the 
primary regulators of health insurance markets – with flexibility. The benchmark 
plan options for each state reflect the scope of benefits and services typically 
offered in the employer market in that state.”). 
76 See 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2015) (indicating that states may select one of the 
following insurance plans as its benchmark plan: “(1) Small group market plan. 
The largest health plan by enrollment in any of the three largest small group 
insurance products. . .in the State’s small group market . . . (2) State employee 
health benefit plan. Any of the largest three employee health benefit plan options 
by enrollment offered and generally available to State employees in the State . . . 
(3) FEHBP plan. Any of the largest three national Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (FEHBP) plan options . . . that is offered to . . . federal 
employees . . . (4) HMO. The coverage plan with the largest insured 
commercial . . . enrollment offered by a health maintenance organization 
operating in the state.”). 
77 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health 
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. at 12,840 (“The EHB-
benchmark plan would serve as a reference plan, reflecting both the scope of 
services and limits offered by a typical employer plan in that state.”). 
78 See EHB Bulletin, supra note 3, at 9 (“In the transitional years of 2014 and 2015, 
if a State chooses a benchmark [plan] subject to State mandates–such as a small 
group market plan–that benchmark should include those mandates in the State 
EHB package.”). See also Cassidy, supra note 61, at 3 (“Most of these [state] 
benefit mandates are typically included in the plans from which states will be able 
to select as the benchmark plan.”). 
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several key Democratic members of Congress strongly objected to the 
Department’s delegation of authority to the states,79 others applauded 
the administration’s willingness to ensure that state governments would 
continue to have a key role in regulating the health insurance market.80 
3. Essential Health Benefits and State Mandated Benefit Laws 
Consistent with the theme of providing states with flexibility in 
implementing its provisions, the ACA explicitly permits states to 
require health plans subject to the EHB provisions to cover benefits and 
services outside of the EHB package, as follows: 
(B) States may require additional benefits 
(i) In general 
Subject to the requirements of clause (ii), a State may 
require that a qualified health plan offered in such State 
offer benefits in addition to the essential health benefits 
specified under section 18022(b) of this title.81 
The Act, however, is not as flexible as it appears at first glance. 
Subsection (3)(B)(ii) of the above–referenced ACA section provides: 
(ii) State must assume cost 
A State shall make payments – 
                                                          
79 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, et al. to The Honorable Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (February 6, 2012) https://wayback.archive-
it.org/4949/20141224080853/http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Sebelius-PPACA-Essential-Health-Benefits-2012-2-
6.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH7M-PL5H] (“When creating the EHB package, we 
intended this to be a federal decision. We had not anticipated your decision to 
delegate the definition of the EHB package to states . . . . [W]e would reiterate 
that one of the primary goals of the Affordable Care Act was to create a consistent 
and comprehensive level of coverage for people across the country. Without very 
careful protections, we have serious concerns about delegating the decision for 
the EHB to the States and providing even further discretion to insurers.”). 
80 See Levey, supra note 65, at 665 (“For their part, many state officials have 
welcomed the HHS directive [regarding the EHB benchmark approach]. ‘The big 
question for us was how prescriptive the federal government was going to be,’ 
says Iowa insurance commissioner Susan Voss. ‘We wanted to have some 
options.’”). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012). 
2017 Too Clever by Half 343 
(I) to an individual enrolled in a qualified health plan 
offered in such State; or 
(II) on behalf of an individual described in subclause (I) 
directly to the qualified health plan in which such 
individual is enrolled; 
to defray the cost of any additional benefits described in 
clause (i).82 
In short, this section of the ACA compels states to “defray” the cost of 
any health services the state requires insurers to provide outside of the 
federally defined EHB package.83 Similar language had been included 
in several draft versions of the health reform legislation, with one key 
distinction: These earlier drafts had required states to assume costs 
attributable to state mandated benefits for only those individual and 
small–group market subscribers receiving federal premium assistance.84 
                                                          
82 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012) (“clause (i)” refers to the section of the 
statute permitting states to require benefits in addition to the EHB package). 
83 Id. See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, Health Law Tempers New State Coverage 
Mandates, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 16, 2014), http://khn.org/news/health-
law-tempers-new-state-coverage-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/7T73-MHKG] 
(“[T]he law requires states, not insurers, to cover the cost of mandates passed after 
2011 that apply to individual and small group plans sold on or off the state health 
insurance marketplaces. If a mandate increases a plan’s premium, states will be 
on the hook for the additional premium cost that’s attributable to the mandate.”). 
84 As indicated, early versions of the health care reform legislation required states to 
defray the additional costs attributable to mandated benefits only for subscribers 
who received advanced premium tax credits to subsidize the purchase of 
insurance. For instance, a preliminary House bill read: 
(d) TREATMENT OF STATE BENEFIT MANDATES. – Insofar as a State 
requires a health insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage to 
include benefits beyond the essential benefits package, such requirement 
shall continue to apply to an Exchange-participating health benefits plan, if 
the State has entered into an arrangement . . . to reimburse the Commissioner 
for the amount of any net increase in affordability premium credits . . . as a 
result of an increase in premium . . . . 
H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 203(d) (2009). Similarly, the Senate HELP 
Committee’s reform legislation included the following provision: 
(F) ADDITIONAL BENEFITS – (i) NO ADDITIONAL FEDERAL COST. – A 
requirement by a state . . . that a qualified health plan cover benefits in 
additional to the essential health benefits required shall not affect the amount 
of a credit provided under section 1311 with respect to such plan. (ii) STATE 
MUST ASSUME COST. – A State shall make payments to or on behalf of 
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In contrast, the final version of the ACA includes this requirement for 
all individual and small–group market subscribers, regardless of 
whether they receive federal subsidies to help pay for their health 
coverage.85 Because the legislative history of the ACA is murky at best, 
it is not clear what motivated Congress to make this significant change 
to the bill’s language.86 Whatever the motivation, the result appears to 
be that the ACA in its current form stands on less stable constitutional 
ground.87 
At least one observer correctly notes the “unusual” nature of this 
provision.88 Rather than use its broad authority under the Commerce 
Clause to directly regulate the scope of insurance benefits available to 
the affected populations and preempt contradictory state mandated 
benefit laws, Congress opted to require states to expend scarce state 
general revenue dollars to subsidize the additional costs attributed to 
state mandated benefits.89 In doing so, Congress apparently sought to 
discourage states from enacting these controversial mandated benefit 
laws.90 Members of Congress apparently felt that if states had to assume 
the costs of these mandated benefits, they would be less likely to enact 
                                                          
an eligible individual to defray the cost of any additional benefits described 
in subparagraph (E). 
S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3101(c)(2)(F) (2009). See also Chapin White & Amanda 
E. Lechner, State Benefits Mandates and National Health Reform, Nat’l Inst. 
For Health Care Reform Policy Analysis No. 8, 1, 3 (Feb. 2012) 
http://nihcr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Policy_Analysis_No._8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2XT-BFEZ] (“States will be allowed to mandate benefits 
that exceed the essential health benefits package, but they will have to pay 
for the cost of the additional benefits for all [qualified health plan] 
enrollees—not just those purchasing through the exchanges and receiving 
federal premium subsidies.”). 
85 Had the statutory language remain tied to federal expenditures (i.e. advance 
premium tax credits), this section arguably would have been enacted pursuant to 
Congress’ spending clause power, thereby altering the commandeering analysis. 
See infra Parts II.A, III.D. 
86 See generally John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: 
How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105:2 LAW LIBRARY 
JOURNAL 131 (2013). 
87 See infra Part III.D 
88 Cassidy, supra note 61, at 3. 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
90 See Andrews, supra note 83 (“To discourage states from passing mandates that 
go beyond essential health benefits requirements, the law requires states . . . to 
cover the cost of mandates passed after 2011 . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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them in the first place.91 Some insurance industry representatives 
thought that this unique approach could help state leaders understand 
the true cost of mandated benefit law. As one insurance executive stated, 
“[Subsection (3)(B)(ii)] was a provision that we thought would really 
drive a discussion about what these benefit mandates cost.”92 
PART II. ENCOURAGEMENT, COERCION, OR COMMANDEERING? 
The constitutional implications of the ACA have been discussed ad 
nauseam.93 The Act’s individual mandate to purchase insurance and 
Medicaid expansion have been the primary subjects that the legal 
academy has analyzed.94 Indeed, the Medicaid expansion called for the 
Supreme Court to assess the federalism implications of the Act.95 
Commentators have also discussed the federalism implications of other 
ACA provisions. 96 The next sections of this article will consider the 
constitutional permissibility of the provisions related to states’ authority 
to require health insurers to “offer benefits in addition to the essential 
health benefits.”97 First, Part II will provide an overview of the Supreme 
Court leading cases prohibiting federal “commandeering” of state 
governments’ legislative and regulatory activity. Part III will make the 
case that the ACA’s limitation on state mandated benefit laws has 
resulted in states being coerced into enforcing a federal regulatory 
program in violation of the anti-commandeering principle. 
                                                          
91 Id. 
92 Levey, supra note 65 at 664. 
93 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act: Swimming in the Stream of Commerce, 35 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 873 (Summer 2012). 
94 See, e.g., id. See also Alicia Ouellette, Health Reform and the Supreme Court: 
The ACA Survives the Battle of the Broccoli and Fortifies Itself Against Future 
Fatal Attack, 76 ALB. L. REV. 87, 90-99 (2012-2013); Nicole Huberfield et al., 
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1 (Jan. 2013). 
95 See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601-09 (2012). 
96 See, e.g., Huberfeld et al., supra note 94. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B) (2012). 
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A. Congressional Encouragement of State Action Via the 
Spending Clause 
While Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate a wide 
range of issues, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from 
“requir[ing] the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”98 
That being said, the Constitution permits a variety of ways in which 
Congress can encourage state policymakers to regulate in accordance 
with Congress’ wishes.99 First, quite plainly, Congress may attach 
conditions to states’ receipt of federal funds.100 In fact, until NFIB v. 
Sebelius, the Supreme Court had never invalidated Congress’ use of its 
spending power for being “unconstitutionally coercive.”101 
Prior to NFIB, South Dakota v. Dole provided a four–factor test for 
determining whether a conditional spending program was 
constitutional: 
The conditions placed on federal grants to States must 
(a) promote the “general welfare,” (b) “unambiguously 
inform” States what is demanded of them, (c) be 
germane “to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs,” and (d) not “induce the States to 
engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”102 
In Dole, the federal statute at issue authorized the Department of 
Transportation to withhold up to five percent of a state’s highway 
appropriation if the state did not raise its drinking age to 21 years.103 In 
upholding the statute, the Court noted that states that opted not to raise 
their drinking age only stood to “lose a relatively small percentage of 
certain federal highway funds.”104 This “relatively mild 
                                                          
98 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
99 See id. at 166. See also Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts’s Individual 
Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUOY 15, 27 (2013). 
100 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). 
101 Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Buss.v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). 
102 Id. (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 210 (1987)). 
103 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
104 See id. (“When we consider . . . that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to 
her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds 
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encouragement” was not enough for the Court to conclude that states 
had been coerced into enacting legislation to raise their respective 
drinking ages.105 
In NFIB, the Court distinguished the ACA Medicaid expansion106 
from Dole: “In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has 
chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’ – it is a gun 
to the head.”107 While the Chief Justice’s opinion discusses the Dole 
factors, ultimately his decision appears to turn on the degree of the 
Medicaid expansion’s impact on state budgets.108 In doing so, the Chief 
Justice may have added a new requirement for conditions on state 
receipt of federal dollars to meet constitutional muster: these conditions 
must not represent a financial “gun to the [state’s] head.”109 Notably, 
the NFIB decision departed from other federal court decisions by 
embracing the idea that courts can meaningfully assess whether a 
                                                          
otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to 
coercion is sown to be more rhetoric than fact.”). 
105 Id. at 211-12. 
106 The ACA expanded eligibility for Medicaid by requiring states to cover childless 
adults with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). The Act provides federal funding to cover a 
substantial majority of the cost of the eligibility expansion. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(y)(1) (2012). Initially, the Act provided 100% federal funding to cover 
the Medicaid expansion’s cost. Id. Over several years of implementation, states 
would eventually be required to provide 10% of the expansion’s cost. Id. “If a 
State [did] not comply with the Act’s new coverage requirements, it [could] lose 
not only the federal funding for those requirements, but all of its federal Medicaid 
funds.” Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Buss.v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 1396c (2012)). 
107 Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Buss.v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (quoting South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987)). 
108 See id. 
109 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A 
Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1297 
(May 2013) (noting “It would have been easy enough for the Dole majority to 
plainly announce five requirements that any condition attached to federal 
spending grants to the states must satisfy: it must promote the general welfare, be 
unambiguous, be germane to the federal interest in the spending program, not 
induce the states to violate the Constitution, and not coerce the states into 
accepting. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion listed the first four 
restrictions in a single paragraph and then, only after determining that none 
condemned the condition on highway funds at issue in that case, introduced 
Steward Machine’s ruminations on coercion almost as an afterthought.”). 
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spending condition is unduly coercive.110 In discussing the NFIB 
decision’s reliance on “that single sentence”111 in Dole which makes 
reference to the possibility that financial incentives offered by Congress 
could “be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion,’”112 Magarian charges the Chief Justice with 
“inflat[ing] . . . a sketchy dictum into a pillar of Spending Clause 
doctrine.”113 While the NFIB Court failed to offer clear guidelines as to 
what constitutes the proverbial “gun to the head,”114 it is apparent that 
the Roberts Court may have opened the door to more lawsuits 
challenging the coercive impact that federal laws may have upon 
states.115 
B. Congressional Commandeering 
In addition to the Spending Clause, Congress can use its authority 
to regulate “commerce among the states”116 to shape state 
policymaking.117 A primary example of this is the concept of 
                                                          
110 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“As we said a half century 
ago in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis: ‘Every rebate from a tax when conditioned 
upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or 
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.’”) 
(citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)); West Virginia 
v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting 
“most courts faced with the question [of where the line between encouragement 
and coercion is crossed] have effectively abandoned any real effort to apply the 
coercion theory.”) (citations omitted). 
111 Magarian, supra note 99, at 27. 
112 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08, 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 
(1937)). 
113 Magarian, supra note 99, at 28. 
114 See Magarian, supra note 99, at 29-30 (“Chief Justice Roberts, in giving the 
[Dole] dictum serious legal effect for the first time, had a responsibility to provide 
guidance to Congress should it seek to repair or replace the PPACA’s leverage 
provision . . . . The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any legal insights as to these 
essential questions completes his NFIB opinion’s catalog of descriptive 
lawlessness.”). 
115 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 94, at 46-47 (“The courthouse doors have now 
been thrown open to challengers seeking to explore the contours of the coercion 
doctrine.”). 
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
117 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992). 
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“cooperative federalism.”118 With cooperative federalism, Congress can 
provide state governments with the option of regulating a “private 
activity . . . according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation.”119 Notably, this rule applies to cases in 
which Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the 
Commerce Clause.120 In addition, when a generally applicable statute 
impacts a state government–even if the federal law effectively requires 
a state legislature to enact new legislation or amend existing statutes121–
the federal statute does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment as long 
as the statute “‘regulates state activities’ rather than ‘seek[ing] to control 
or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.’”122 
While Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce can be used 
to cajole states into pursuing certain policies, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that Congress cannot “simply ‘commandeer the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce 
a federal regulatory program.’”123 A federal statute that requires state 
officials merely to “consider[] . . . federal standards” when formulating 
state polices does not “commandeer” a state’s legislative process.124 
Likewise, when a state chooses not to regulate a field that is otherwise 
subject to federal preemption, there is no commandeering.125 However, 
Congress cannot, under the guise of giving states a “choice,” coerce 
                                                          
118 Id. at 167 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
119 New York, 505 U.S. at 167. (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). See Hodel, 452 U.S. 
at 288 (noting that a federal statute governing the “activities of coal mine 
operators who are private individuals” was not impermissibly coercive where 
states were given the option to either propose a state regulatory scheme in 
accordance with the federal act or elect to have the federal government bear “the 
full regulatory burden.”). 
120 Where a federal law requires a state “in [its] sovereign capacity to regulate [its] 
own citizens” in accordance with said federal law, the analysis is markedly 
different. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in 
the Commerce Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation 
of interstate commerce.”). 
121 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988). 
122 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15). 
123 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel 452 U.S. at 288). 
124 New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 
(1982)). 
125 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
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states into enforcing a federal regulatory program.126 As the Supreme 
Court stated in New York v. U.S., its leading anti-commandeering case: 
In this provision, Congress has not held out the threat of 
exercising its spending power or  its commerce 
power; it has instead held out the threat, should the 
States not regulate  according to one federal 
instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to 
another  federal instruction. A choice between two 
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory  techniques 
is not choice at all.127 
The “two unconstitutionally coercive” choices that states were given in 
New York were: (1) enact and enforce a federal regulatory program to 
manage low-level radioactive waste or (2) “take title” to the privately 
owned low-level radioactive waste in one’s state and assume waste 
generators’ liability for any and all associated damages.128 In discussing 
this false choice, the Court stated: 
[T]he Constitution would not permit Congress simply to 
transfer radioactive waste from generators to state 
governments. Such a forced transfer, standing alone, 
would in principle be no different than a congressionally 
compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive 
waste producers. The same is true of the provision 
requiring  States to become liable for the 
generators’ damages. Standing alone, this provision 
would be indistinguishable from an Act of Congress 
directing the States to assume the  liabilities of 
certain state residents. Either type of federal action 
would ‘commandeer’  state governments into the service 
of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason 
be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of 
authority between federal and state governments.129 
                                                          
126 New York, 505 U.S. at 176, 188. 
127 Id. at 176. 
128 Id. at 174-75. 
129 Id. at 175. 
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The prohibition on federal commandeering applies regardless of how 
compelling a federal interest may be.130 If a federal interest compels 
Congress to regulate, “it must do so directly; it may not conscript state 
governments as its agents.”131 Finally, as the Supreme Court made clear 
in Printz v. U.S., a federal law need not directly command states to enact 
legislation or “make policy” to run afoul of New York’s commandeering 
principle.132 Requiring state executive branch officials to enforce a 
federal regulatory program is sufficient to constitute commandeering.133 
The New York Court was concerned about the impact of federal 
commandeering on the allocation of political accountability: “[W]here 
the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability 
of both state and federal officials is diminished.”134 In contrast to 
conditional spending and cooperative federalism, state citizens, 
practically speaking, cannot decline to obey Congress’ instructions.135 
“Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, 
state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s 
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”136 When 
Congress commandeers state governments, political accountability lines 
are blurred to such a great extent that “it may be state officials who will 
bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who 
                                                          
130 See id. at 178 (“No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the 
Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate.”). 
131 Id. at 178. See id. at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in the Commerce 
Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does 
not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.”). 
132 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-31(1997). See id. at 935 (“The Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, not command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved . . . .”). 
133 Id. at 935. 
134 New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
135 See id. at 168 (“If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to 
local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. If state residents would 
prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems other 
than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal 
Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated 
regulatory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the 
extent state law is not pre-empted.”). 
136 Id. at 168. 
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devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral 
ramifications of their decision.”137 
PART III. THE UNEXPLORED COMMANDEERING FEATURES OF 
SECTION 1311 
While state leaders and health policy experts have taken note of the 
ACA’s innovative approach to state mandated benefits,138 few if any 
have explored the constitutional implications of this provision. It 
appears state policymakers have accepted the new reality: if they wish 
to enact new mandated benefit laws, they must subsidize the costs 
incurred by health insurers’ provision of those benefits.139 While there 
are ways to draft mandated benefit legislation so as not to trigger the 
ACA “defray the cost” provision,140 the practical benefit of drafting 
legislation in that manner is probably limited.141 To date, it does not 
appear that the federal government has enforced this provision in 
response to the enactment of a state mandated benefit law.142 
The requirement that a state defray the costs associated with 
mandated benefit laws is “unusual” to say the least.143 It does not fit 
neatly within existing paradigms of federalism. This is not a case in 
which Congress has preempted contradictory state laws.144 The plain 
                                                          
137 Id. at 169. 
138 See, e.g., NY Assembly Hearing Notice, supra note 1. 
139 See, e.g., NY Assembly Hearing Notice, supra note 1. See also Millman, supra 
note 67 (describing some state officials as “particularly fearful that the state-
required benefits will exceed the federal requirements, leaving them on the hook 
to make up the cost of premium subsidies derived from the mandates.”). 
140 See infra Part IV.B. 
141 A substantial portion of the employer sponsored insurance market is already 
exempt from state regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52. 
Therefore, drafting state mandated benefit legislation that only applies to the large 
group market, so as to avoid triggering the ACA “defray the cost” requirement, 
will likely have only minimal benefits for state citizens. See infra Part IV.B. 
142 See Letter from Anne Marie Crosswell, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the State of South 
Carolina, to Michael W. Grambell, Member of the South Carolina House of 
Representatives (Dec. 18, 2015), 2015 WL 9581246 (S.C.A.G.) at *1 (“There is 
no history of a state triggering the reimbursements or precedents for state 
payments for expanded coverage requirements, and the responsibilities of a state 
with regard to this component of the ACA has not been established.”). 
143 Cassidy, supra note 61, at 3. 
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012). See also infra Part III-A. 
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language of the statute in question explicitly reserves a state’s authority 
to require insurers to cover benefits and services beyond the EHB 
package.145 Nor is this a situation in which states are given a no-strings-
attached option to either enforce a federal regulatory standard or allow 
the federal government to step in and enforce its own laws.146 Nor are 
states faced with a “generally applicable” federal law that has incidental 
financial impacts on state governments.147 Finally, while early drafts of 
the 2009-2010 health care reform legislation had tied this provision to 
federal subsidies,148 the provision as enacted has no direct ties to federal 
spending.149 Therefore, it cannot reasonably be argued that Congress 
was using its authority to attach conditions to federal spending when it 
enacted the defray–the–cost provision.150 
At first glance, the provision in question may not appear to fit within 
the Court’s prohibition on commandeering of state government 
policymaking either. The principal commandeering case struck down 
federal laws that compelled proactive state government regulation of a 
theretofore unregulated issue.151 Here, rather than compelling proactive 
regulation, the federal law in question strongly discourages state 
regulatory activity by exacting a financial penalty from states should 
they engage in health plan content regulation.152 However, as indicated 
above, this strong discouragement falls short of preemption.153 It 
appears Congress wanted to prevent states from enacting mandated 
benefit laws without dealing with the consequential political 
ramifications of expressly preempting state laws and, thus, advancing a 
“federal government takeover of health care.”154 While the Act’s impact 
                                                          
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i). See also infra Part III-A. 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). See also infra Part III.B. 
147 Contra Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150-51 (2000). See infra Part III.C. 
148 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
149 See infra Part III.D. 
150 See infra Part III.D. 
151 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992). 
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). See also supra Part I.C.3. 
153 See supra Part I.C.3. 
154 Pear, supra note 66. See Sam Solomon, Health Exchange Federalism: Striking 
the Balance Between State Flexibility and Consumer Protection in ACA 
Implementation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2090-91 (June 2013) (“The political 
climate at the time the health reform bills were being considered was extremely 
hostile to what was being called, pejoratively, a federal ‘takeover’ of the health 
care system . . . . This [political] climate did not encourage legislation authorizing 
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on state content regulation may not fit neatly into existing precedent, the 
statute here features all of the principal ills that the New York and Printz 
Courts were most concerned with.155 The ACA provision here does not 
preempt state law, nor does it permit states to regulate beyond the 
federal minimum standards without a financial penalty.156 As such, the 
statute requires states to “govern according to Congress’ 
instructions”:157 Enforce the federal EHB package as is, or else. 
A. Section 1311(d)(3)(B) does not preempt state mandated 
benefit laws. 
Even a cursory review of the statute in question confirms that the 
§ 1311(d)(3)(B) does not preempt state mandated benefit laws. Indeed, 
in enacting the EHB package, Congress engaged in heretofore 
unprecedented federal content regulation of health plans.158 However, 
throughout the ACA implementation process, perhaps for political 
reasons, federal officials appeared to bend over backward to ensure that 
states would continue to have an active role in regulating the health 
insurance market.159 On its face, section 1311(d)(3) is no different in 
this regard. The statute reads, “a State may require that a qualified health 
plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the essential 
health benefits specified under section 18022(b) of this title.”160 
                                                          
the federal government to expand its direct rulemaking authority into areas 
traditionally regulated by the states, such as insurance law.”) (citations omitted). 
155 See infra Part III.E. 
156 See supra Part I.C.3. 
157 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). 
158 Historically, states have taken the lead on regulating health plan content. See 
Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market?, supra note 17, at 
1365 (“Using the authority granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the states 
have actively regulated the health insurance industry, not only by regulating the 
business of insurance companies, but also in requiring health insurance contracts 
to contain certain substantive coverage provisions in the form of mandated benefit 
laws.”). 
159 See Kyle Thomas, State-Run Insurance Exchanges in Federal Healthcare 
Reform: A Case Study in Dysfunctional Federalism, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 548, 
550 (2012) (noting that “the federal government has gone to great lengths to 
continue to share power with the states . . . .” despite the federal government’s 
increased role in health care regulation). See also Pear, supra note 66 (discussing 
the Obama Administration’s decision to “giv[e] states the discretion to specify 
essential benefits . . . .”). 
160 42 U.S.C. § 13031(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012). 
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Congress could have expressly preempted state laws requiring benefits 
above and beyond the EHB package.161 For whatever reason, Congress 
chose not to do this.162 In fact, Congress affirmatively did the exact 
opposite by permitting states to continue to enact laws requiring 
“benefits in addition to the essential health benefits.”163 In construing 
the language of the statute, there can be no reasonable argument to the 
contrary. 
B. Section 1311(d)(3)(B) is not an example of cooperative 
federalism. 
Just as Congress could have expressly preempted state laws that 
conflicted with the federal EHB package, Congress could have used a 
cooperative federalism approach to defining the federal EHB 
package.164 As it has done on so many other occasions, Congress could 
have defined the general parameters of its preferred regulatory scheme 
and thereafter permitted states to choose either to (1) enforce the federal 
regulatory scheme or (2) allow the federal government to step in and 
enforce its regulations.165 Had it elected to utilize a so-called conditional 
preemption scheme to enforce the EHB package, Congress would not 
have run afoul of the anti-commandeering rule.166 In cooperative 
federalist arrangements, the only penalty for opting not to enforce the 
federal regulatory program is federal preemption.167 In contrast, here, 
there is a substantial financial penalty for regulating beyond the 
parameters of the federal standard.168 If a state wishes to enact more 
stringent regulations than the federal EHB package, it must subsidize 
                                                          
161 Indeed, Congress has expressly preempted state laws regulating health benefits in 
other statutes. See supra Part I. B.2. A full analysis of the various forms of federal 
preemption is beyond the scope of this article. Thus, the article assumes arguendo 
that the statute in question, by not expressly preempting state mandated benefit 
laws, does not preempt state mandated benefit laws. 
162 See Pear, supra note 66 (discussing the Obama Administration’s decision to 
“giv[e] states the discretion to specify essential benefits . . . .”). 
163 42 U.S.C. § 13031(d)(3)(B)(i). 
164 Some commentators have argued that §1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) does in fact represent a 
cooperative federalism approach. See infra text accompanying notes 256-57. 
165 See supra Part II.B. 
166 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (describing 
permissible cooperative federalism program features). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). See also supra Part I.C.3. 
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private party costs attributable to those more stringent state 
regulations.169 Therefore, section 1311(d)(3)(B) cannot reasonably be 
construed as a cooperative federalist approach to health plan content 
regulation. 
One of the cases upon which the New York court heavily relied in 
pronouncing the modern anti-commandeering rule illustrates 
permissible conditional preemption. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., the Supreme Court 
considered a Tenth Amendment challenge to the federal Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.170 This statute was intended to 
“establish a nationwide program to protect society and environment 
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.”171 Among 
other provisions, the law provided states with the option of either 
developing and implementing a state regulatory program that met the 
standards established in the federal act or permit a newly created federal 
agency to enforce the federal standards.172 Because the statute’s 
provisions did not compel “the States . . . to enforce the [federal 
standards], to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal 
regulatory program in any manner whatsoever,” the Court upheld the 
challenged sections.173 The Court described the Hodel statute as 
“establish[ing] a program of cooperative federalism”174 whereby “the 
full regulatory burden [would] be borne by the Federal Government”175 
                                                          
169 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
170 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 268 
(1981). 
171 Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. §1202(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III)). 
172 Id. at 271-72 (“[A]ny State wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority 
over the surface coal mining operations . . . within its borders must submit a 
proposed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval. The proposed 
program must demonstrate the that state legislature has enacted laws 
implementing the environmental protection standards established by the Act and 
accompanying regulations . . . . In addition, the Secretary must develop and 
implement a federal permanent program for each State that fails to submit or 
enforce a satisfactory state program. In such situations, the Secretary constitutes 
the regulatory authority administering the Act within that State and continues as 
such unless and until a ‘state program’ is approved.”) (citations omitted). 
173 Id. at 288. 
174 Id. at 289. 
175 Id. at 288. 
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if a state chose not to adopt its own program.176 In sum, cooperative 
federalism programs that provide states with the option to regulate in 
accordance with federally defined standards do not violate the Tenth 
Amendment, as long as the there is no penalty for choosing not the 
enforce the federal program177 and the federal program is otherwise 
within the federal government’s power to regulate “private activities 
affecting interstate commerce.”178 
Cooperative federalism is commonly used in health care policy.179 
One example of shared federal and state responsibility for health care 
regulation enforcement is the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).180 There, the statute permits but does not 
mandate states to “require that health insurance issuers that issue . . . 
health insurance coverage in the State in the individual or group market 
meet” HIPAA’s requirements.181 Similar to other cooperative 
federalism programs, the consequence of a state failing to “substantially 
                                                          
176 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (discussing other 
“programs of cooperative federalism” in existence at the time of the New York 
Court’s decision). 
177 See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 747 (1982) 
(noting that the statute in question “does not provide penalties for [a state’s] 
failure to meet these deadlines [for compliance with federal standard].”); Id. at 
748 (noting again that the statute in question did not provide for a “penalty . . . for 
failure to meet” another federal deadline). See also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (noting 
that the federal act did not compel the state to “expend any state funds” in 
furtherance of the federal regulatory program). 
178 Hodel, 452 U.S at 290. 
179 See Abbie R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L. J. 
534, 584 (Dec. 2011) (describing Medicaid and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program as “classic [examples of] ‘cooperative federalism’ 
programs.”); Thomas, supra note 159, at 550 (describing Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program as examples of “cooperative federalism.”). 
See also id. (noting that “the federal government has gone to great lengths to 
continue to share power with the states . . . .” despite the federal government’s 
increased role in health care regulation.); Solomon, supra note 154, at 2090 
(discussing Congress’ intent to pursue a “cooperative federalism approach” in 
enacting the ACA). 
180 See Alexander B. Blum et al., Implementing Health Reform in an Era of Semi-
Cooperative Federalism: Lessons from the Age 26 Expansion, 10 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMED. L. 327, 330 (2015) (describing HIPAA as having “introduced the 
concept of preemptive federal regulatory standards that set minimum ground rules 
for health insurance conduct in the market.”). 
181 42. U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1) (2012). 
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enforce” the federal law’s provisions is direct federal enforcement.182 
While the process for invoking federal enforcement is complicated,183 
it is apparent that states are not penalized for any failure to enforce the 
federal law’s provisions. In addition, states are permitted to 
“supplement” HIPAA’s provisions by enacting more stringent 
regulations.184 As such, in enacting HIPAA, Congress appears to have 
respected the Supreme Court’s directive not to commandeer state 
legislative processes. The statute is carefully structured to permit but not 
command state enforcement activities.185 
The ACA builds on HIPAA’s shared enforcement model.186 The 
ACA provisions related to health insurance exchanges provide a 
primary example of this shared enforcement model.187 At first glance, 
the ACA language regarding health insurance exchanges appears to 
present a commandeering problem:188 “Each State shall, not later than 
January 1, 2014, establish an American Health Benefit Exchange . . . for 
the State . . . .”189 On its face, this ACA section appears to command 
state legislatures to enact a law establishing a marketplace for health 
insurance known as a health benefit exchange, squarely in violation of 
New York’s prohibition on commandeering.190 However, “perhaps 
recognizing the potential commandeering problem,”191 the Act then 
provides a federal fallback option: 
                                                          
182 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2). 
183 See generally Blum et al., supra note 180, at 340-46. 
184 Jost & Hall, supra note 52, at 399. 
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1) (“[E]ach State may require that health insurance 
issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer health insurance coverage in the State in 
the individual or group market meet the requirements of this part with respect to 
such issuers.”) (emphasis added). 
186 See Blum et al., supra note 180, at 330 (noting that the ACA “borrow[ed] from 
the enforcement mechanism established under” HIPAA). 
187 See id. 
188 See Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: 
Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 SPG KAN. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 199, 213 (Spring 2011) (“[By requiring states to establish a health 
exchange,] Section 1311 in isolation would unquestionably violate the 
constitutional prohibition on commandeering.”). 
189 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012). 
190 See Adler, supra note 188, at 213. 
191 Id. 
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If (A) a State is not an electing State under subsection 
(b); or (B) the Secretary [of Health  and Human 
Services] determines, on or before January 1, 2013, that 
an electing State (i)  will not have any required 
Exchange operational by January 1, 2014 . . . the 
Secretary  shall . . . establish and operate such 
Exchange within the State . . . .192 
Effectively, this provision renders the Act’s requirement to establish a 
health exchange optional.193 Here, similar to HIPAA, if a state fails to 
comply with Congress’ wish, there is no penalty for the state. The only 
consequence for a state that fails to create a health benefit exchange is 
the federal government stepping in and creating an exchange for the 
noncompliant state’s market. 
Section 1311(d)(3)(B) stands in stark contrast to the variety of 
permissible cooperative federalism programs that Congress has enacted. 
Plainly, as it did elsewhere in the ACA and with HIPAA, 194 Congress 
could have defined the EHB package and given states the option to 
enforce the federal law. The constitutionality of such an approach is not 
in question.195 Congress could have provided for a no-strings-attached 
federal enforcement fallback in the event that a state either chose not to 
enforce or otherwise “substantially failed” to enforce196 the federal EHB 
requirements. Rather than use this established model of federal-state 
cooperation, Congress opted instead to levy a significant financial 
penalty on states that choose not enforce the EHB package as defined 
by Congress.197 Moreover, unlike HIPAA, which establishes a 
regulatory floor that states can supplement with more stringent 
regulations,198 section 1311(d)(3)(B) establishes a de facto regulatory 
ceiling.199 While states are not technically prohibited from exceeding 
                                                          
192 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
193 See Adler, supra note 188, at 213. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 179-92. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 170-78. 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 179-92. 
197 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B) (2012). 
198 See Blum et al., supra note 180, at 330-31. 
199 While the required subsidy will vary by benefit mandate and by state, the amount 
of the subsidy appears to be high enough to discourage states from enacting new 
mandated benefits. See Monahan, The ACA, the Large Group Market, and 
Content Regulation, supra note 28, at 98 (“Given most states’ strained fiscal 
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the EHB floor, they can exceed the congressionally established floor 
only by providing a federally mandated subsidy to private insurance 
companies.200 Therefore, Congress’ approach here is not at all 
consistent with constitutionally permissible cooperative federalism. 
C. Section 1311(d)(3)(B) is not a generally applicable law with 
incidental impacts on state governments. 
Congress may, consistent with the Tenth Amendment, enact 
generally applicable federal laws that incidentally burden state 
governments.201 This is true even if the federal law requires states to 
enact new laws, promulgate new regulations, or amend existing laws 
and regulations.202 Courts will seek to distinguish between federal 
statutes that regulate “state activities”203 and those that seek to “require 
the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens.”204 
In Reno v. Condon, the Court upheld the Driver’s Privacy Protection 
Act of 1994, a federal statute that regulated the disclosure of “personal 
information contained in the records of state motor vehicle 
departments.”205 The statute was upheld in spite of South Carolina’s 
argument that compliance with the statute “thrusts upon the States all of 
the day-to-day responsibility for administering its complex provisions” 
                                                          
position, it seems likely that state will simply eliminate any mandates in the 
individual and small group markets that exceed the essential health benefit 
requirements.”). See also Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 30, at 
152 (“[T]he subsidy that would be required would often be substantial. As a 
practical matter, this direct cost to the state of mandated health benefits that 
exceed essential health benefits requirements makes it highly unlikely that states 
will regulate the content of coverage in the individual and small group market.”). 
For instance, at the time of implementation, the state of Maryland estimated that 
its then-existing mandates would require it to appropriate up to $80 million 
annually to defray insurers’ compliance costs. Cassidy, supra note 61, at 3-4. 
200 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
202 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (noting that the 
fact that a state “wishing to engage in certain activity” regulated by a generally 
applicable federal statute “must take administrative and sometimes legislative 
action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace 
that presents no constitutional defect.”). 
203 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 
U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988)). 
204 Id. at 151. 
205 Id. at 143. 
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and would unreasonably “consume . . . state resources.”206 Rather than 
regulating the states “in their sovereign capacity,” the Court found that 
the statute regulated states as “owners of [motor vehicle information] 
databases.”207 Further, because the statute regulated “private resellers” 
of motor vehicle information as well as state governments, the generally 
applicable statute did not run afoul of the Court’s anti-commandeering 
rule from New York.208 
Unlike the statute in Reno, section 1311(d)(3) is not generally 
applicable. It is a direct command upon the states “in their sovereign 
capacity.”209 The statute is directed squarely at “states.”210 Unlike Reno, 
where private entities could have been subjected to the statute’s 
provisions, here there are no other entities that can take action to 
“require that a qualified health plan offered in such State offer benefits 
in addition to the essential health benefits.”211 Enacting laws that require 
health insurers to cover specified benefits is a legislative function. This 
is in no way a generally applicable statute. Therefore, it cannot fall 
within Congress’ authority to enact generally applicable laws regulating 
private activity that have incidental impacts on state governments.212 
The impact of the ACA’s requirement that states defray costs associated 
with state mandated benefit laws is far from incidental. Rather, section 
1311(d)(3)(B)’s impact is direct, substantial, and intentional. 
D. Section 1311(d)(3)(B) does not constitute conditional use of 
the Spending Power. 
While the ACA features significant use of Congress’ authority under 
the Spending Clause,213 section 1311(d)(3)(B) is not one of the Act’s 
Spending Clause provisions. By enacting this provision, Congress did 
not condition states’ receipt of new or existing federal grants on 
                                                          
206 Id. at 149-50 (citations omitted). 
207 Id. at 151. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i) (2012) (“[A] State may require that a qualified 
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refraining from enacting new state mandated benefit laws.214 Here, 
rather than benefit from federal funds should they comply with a 
federally imposed condition, states are forced to spend state dollars if 
they choose not to enforce the federal regulatory program as instructed 
by Congress.215 Should states continue to exercise their police power by 
regulating the insurance industry, Congress has forced them to subsidize 
private party costs.216 As discussed above, at least two early drafts of 
the 2009-10 health care reform bills appeared to have had more direct 
ties to federal spending.217 These drafts applied section 1311’s “defray 
the cost” provision only to those plans purchased by subscribers 
receiving federally–funded subsidies to purchase insurance.218 Had the 
final version of the law limited this provision in this way, a more 
thorough discussion of conditional spending would be warranted. 
However, the “defray the cost” provision applies to all plans offered on 
the individual and small group markets, regardless of the use of federal 
subsidies.219 As such, the final version of this ACA provision does not 
implicate the Spending Clause in the way that the early drafts would 
have. 
Prior to the ACA, Congress used its Spending Clause authority to 
attempt to influence state mandated benefit laws in a way that apparently 
did not implicate the commandeering doctrine.220 The Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvements, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
among other things, authorized the creation of “health savings accounts” 
(HSAs).221 HSAs are “tax-free financial accounts that are designed to 
help individuals save for future health care expenses.”222 To use a tax-
advantaged HSA, the individual must be covered by a “high deductible 
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health plan.”223 At the time of the federal law’s enactment, many states 
had mandated benefit laws on the books that did not permit the 
imposition of a deductible on those specified benefits.224 As such, 
residents of those states could not establish HSAs until states amended 
their laws to permit the use of high deductible plans, notwithstanding 
contradictory state mandated benefit laws.225 As Monahan noted, 
In terms of its effect on mandated benefit reform, the 
health savings account legislation can perhaps best be 
described as incentive-based deregulation. While not 
requiring states to amend their mandated benefit laws, it 
does create a significant incentive to do so . . . . With the 
voluntary nature of the deregulation, states are able to 
weight to value of offering their residents health savings 
accounts against the value of the conflicting mandated 
benefit laws.226 
The HSA experience demonstrates yet another way in which Congress 
could have, but chose not to, incentivize “deregulation” of state 
mandated benefit laws. 
E. Section 1311(d)(3)(B) commandeers state governments. 
By exacting a financial penalty from state governments for 
regulating health benefits beyond the federal EHB standard, ACA 
section 1311(d)(3)(B) has commandeered state governments in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment. As established above, Congress did 
not utilize one of the several permissible strategies to encourage states 
to enforce the federal EHB regulations.227 Instead, Congress imposed a 
statutory straightjacket on states’ long-recognized authority to regulate 
health insurance plan content. While purportedly allowing states to 
continue to mandate health benefits not otherwise required by the EHB 
standards,228 Congress in fact imposed a significant, direct financial 
penalty on states that dare exceed the federally established regulatory 
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ceiling.229 This “defray the cost” scheme offers states a false choice: 
either enforce the federal EHB package as defined by Congress, or be 
forced to subsidize private insurers’ costs of complying with state laws 
in a non-preempted field. 
1. “Congressionally compelled subsidy” 
Section 1311(d)(3)(B) of the ACA is, in fact, on all fours with the 
“take-title” provision that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional 
in New York. As was the case there, neither of the two “choices” that 
states have in this instance are within Congress’ power to offer states. 
Quite clearly, Congress cannot mandate that state governments enforce 
its EHB scheme without violating the Tenth Amendment.230 Nor can 
Congress force states to “defray”–in other words subsidize–insurers’ 
costs of complying with mandated benefits laws.231 The “defray the 
cost” requirement is no different from New York’s take title provision. 
In New York, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that Congress could 
force states to assume private nuclear waste producers’ liabilities if the 
states failed to enact and enforce the federally prescribed regulatory 
scheme.232 Here, states are faced with the same type of “congressionally 
compelled subsidy from state governments” to private parties that the 
New York court rejected.233 In New York, the Supreme Court did not 
hesitate to declare that this attempt to “direct the States to assume the 
liabilities of certain residents” “commandeer[ed] state governments into 
the service of federal regulatory purposes.”234 Nor should federal courts 
hesitate to declare that section 1311(d)(3)(B) is “inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state 
governments”235 and, thus, unconstitutional. 
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2. Federal Regulation of State Governments’ Regulation of 
Interstate Commerce 
The fact that the ACA provision in question does not require states 
to proactively legislate in furtherance of a federal regulatory purpose is 
of no practical import.236 First, the Printz Court rejected the idea that 
there is a difference between making law and merely enforcing federal 
standards for commandeering purposes.237 As such, New York’s 
prohibition on commandeering is applicable here, despite the fact that 
there is no “command” to enact new legislation or regulations.238 As the 
Court noted in Printz, to the extent that the federal law in question leaves 
little or no discretion to state governments to make policy, Congress’ 
violation of the anti-commandeering rule is actually more egregious.239 
Accordingly, unless states yield to the unconstitutional federally 
mandated subsidy discussed above, they are left with no discretion to 
regulate the content of health insurance plans issued in their states. 
The New York decision unambiguously describes the crux of the 
commandeering inquiry: “The allocation of power contained in the 
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate 
state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”240 The Court’s 
commandeering precedent makes no distinction between congressional 
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acts which require proactive state regulatory or enforcement activity and 
“commanding the nonuse of state machinery to regulate.”241 The 
question is, regardless of how compelling the federal interest at issue 
may be, has Congress regulated the several states’ regulation of 
interstate commerce?242 As the Ninth Circuit observed, no Supreme 
Court precedent examining the scope of Congress’ authority to regulate 
interstate commerce “holds or even suggests that a state’s exercise of its 
police power with respect to an economic activity which affects 
interstate commerce is itself an economic activity . . . subject to 
regulation by Congress.”243 Unquestionably, section 1311(d)(3)(B) 
treats states’ exercise of their “police power with respect to an economic 
activity which affects interstate commerce” as an economic activity in 
and of itself “subject to regulation by Congress.”244 Regardless of the 
level of coercion at issue, there can be no question that this section of 
the ACA seeks to “regulate state governments’ regulation”245 of health 
insurance benefits. 
3. Political Accountability 
Among the Supreme Court’s primary concerns with the statute at 
issue in New York was the “diminish[ed]” political accountability that 
would result from federal commandeering of state governments.246 
Under the permissible forms of federal encouragement of state 
regulatory activity, states “may choose to have the Federal Government 
rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regulatory 
program” in the event that its “residents would prefer their government 
to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those 
deemed important by Congress.”247 Moreover, federal 
“encouragement” of state regulatory activity permits state elected 
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officials to “remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences.”248 
Where Congress coerces state officials into enacting and enforcing 
federal programs, however, voters cannot hold the responsible 
government officials accountable for their decisions.249 As the Court 
stated, when Congress commandeers state governments into action, “it 
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”250 
Section 1311(d)(3)(B) presents the risk of misplaced public 
disapproval that the Supreme Court discussed in New York. At the very 
least, the lines of political accountability regarding state mandated 
benefit legislation will now be blurred. In the event that states leaders 
fail to respond to constituents that petition them to enact mandated 
benefit legislation, it is likely that these constituents will place “the 
brunt of public disapproval”251 on said state leaders. Certainly, it 
ordinarily would not make sense for state citizens to hold federal 
officials accountable for a state legislature’s failure to enact state 
legislation. However, it is apparent that the “defray the cost” 
requirement may prove to be a substantial, if not predominant, factor in 
state leaders’ decision to refrain from enacting new mandated benefit 
laws.252 As such, federal officials should share in any resultant political 
ramifications for a state’s failure to enact mandated benefit laws. Here, 
state leaders are not free to “remain responsive to the local electorate’s 
preferences”253 without incurring substantial financial costs.254 
Had Congress simply precluded states from enacting mandated 
benefit legislation via federal preemption, there would be no confusion 
about who an aggrieved constituent should blame for their state 
legislature’s failure to respond to their advocacy. With federal 
preemption, “it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in 
full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the 
consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or 
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unpopular.”255 That is not the case with section 1311(d)(3)(B). Here, 
Congress apparently sought to devise a way to prevent states from 
enacting mandated benefit laws without the risk of suffering the political 
consequences of “mak[ing] the decision” to preempt state laws “in full 
view of the public.”256 While innovative, Congress’ chosen path 
violates the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on commandeering of state 
governments. 
4. Administrative deference to states does not save the ACA 
from commandeering scrutiny. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Obama 
administration’s initial incorporation of state mandated benefit laws into 
the EHB definition somehow alters the constitutional analysis of 
section 1311(d)(3)(B).257 This line of reasoning supposes that, 
regardless of what the statute says, one federal bureaucrat’s indication 
that she is willing to use her “discretion cooperatively to accommodate 
state regulatory preferences” is sufficient to render the statute an 
example of cooperative federalism.258 However, to accept the ACA’s 
“defray the cost” requirements as emblematic of cooperative federalism 
would be to ignore decades of Supreme Court decisions. Permissible 
cooperative federalism programs permit states to choose to either (1) 
regulate an activity in accordance with federal guidelines or (2) refrain 
from regulating the activity, thereby permitting “the full regulatory 
burden [to] be borne by the federal government.”259 Where the only 
alternative to enforcing the federal program is a congressionally 
mandated subsidy to private industry, as is the case with the “defray the 
cost” requirement, the Supreme Court has held that the federal law 
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commandeers state governments.260 While it may be true that some 
ACA provisions “limit[] state power considerably less than its 
detractors suggest,”261 that cannot be said of section 1311(d)(3)(B). The 
Obama Administration’s “benchmark” approach to defining the EHB 
package cannot and does not alter the commandeering analysis herein, 
nor does it transform section 1311(d)(3)(B) into something it is not – a 
model of cooperative federalism.262 
5. Federal Coercion of State Governments and the Roberts 
Court 
To the extent that the Roberts Court has opened the door to a more 
liberal treatment of federal financial “coercion” of state governments, 
the NFIB decision also provides support for the argument that 
section 1311(d)(3)(B) violates the Tenth Amendment. Obviously, the 
NFIB court considered the withholding of federal funds from states.263 
Here, states are faced with the congressionally compelled expenditure 
of state funds. While admittedly a horse of a different color than the 
Medicaid expansion considered in NFIB, an unduly coercive financial 
inducement is an unduly coercive financial inducement regardless of 
which side of the ledger it applies to. 
PART IV. REMEDYING THE COMMANDEERING PROBLEM 
Having established that section 1311(d)(3)(B) unconstitutionally 
commandeers state governments, this section will explore (1) Congress’ 
options to bring this portion of the ACA back into conformance with 
prevailing constitutional norms and (2) states’ options to avoid 
triggering the “defray the cost” provision in the event that Congress does 
nothing. 
A. What can Congress do to remedy § 1311(d)(3)(B)’s 
commandeering problem? 
Congress has several options to amend the ACA to avoid violating 
the anti-commandeering rule. First and foremost, Congress could 
modify section 1311 by deleting subsection (d)(3)(B) in its entirety. 
This would restore the health plan content regulation to the pre-ACA 
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status quo. The federal EHB package would continue to exist. In 
pursuing this approach, Congress could devise a truly cooperative 
federalist arrangement to enforcing the EHB package.264 For example, 
Congress could amend the ACA to permit states to enforce the EHB 
package without a financial penalty.265 Under the cooperative 
federalism model, in the event a state chose not to enforce the EHB 
provisions, the statute could provide for a federal enforcement fallback 
option.266 With this approach, the EHB package would provide a federal 
regulatory floor rather than ceiling for states.267 As they are in so many 
other areas of the law, states would be free to enact more stringent laws 
and regulations.268 But, significantly, there would no longer be a 
financial penalty should a state exercise its traditional role as primary 
regulator of the health insurance industry.269 
Congress could also amend the statute to expressly preempt state 
mandated benefit laws that conflict with the federal EHB package.270 
While federal preemption of state law is far from unusual in the health 
care field,271 this could be difficult to accomplish in the current political 
environment.272 Moreover, there is disagreement among scholars 
regarding the wisdom of prohibiting states from engaging in health plan 
content regulation.273 
To tie the “defray the cost” requirement to the line of cases 
permitting broad federal authority to attach conditions to the receipt of 
federal funds, Congress also could redraft the law to apply only this 
requirement to health plans purchased with federal subsidies. As 
discussed, early drafts of the ACA did just that.274 While the 
permissibility of conditional spending requirements is somewhat in flux 
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in light of NFIB,275 surely this approach would put the “defray the cost” 
requirement on firmer constitutional ground than it currently rests. 
B. What can States do to avoid triggering the “defray the cost” 
subsidy? 
While states have enacted mandated benefit laws at a less frequent 
pace since the ACA’s implementation,276 they have not ceased enacting 
mandated benefit laws altogether.277 States can enact mandated benefit 
laws without triggering section 1311(d)(3)(B), because that section 
applies only to plans offered on the small group and individual insurance 
markets.278 As such, states can enact mandated benefit laws that apply 
only to the large group market without triggering subsection 
(d)(3)(B).279 That being said, the utility of drafting around section 
1311(d)(3)(B) in this manner is limited due to the fact that the number 
of employers choosing to self-insure is substantial.280 As such, the 
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number of state residents that would benefit from a state mandated 
benefit law that only applies to the large group market would be 
correspondingly small.281 Whether state leaders would be willing to 
accept the potential political consequences of enacting controversial 
mandated benefit legislation that only benefits a relatively small number 
of constituents remains to be seen. 
The ACA also provides states with the option of applying for an 
innovation waiver.282 If granted a waiver, states would be released from 
the requirements of some ACA provisions283 and would thus be 
permitted to experiment with policies not otherwise allowed under the 
ACA.284 The innovation waiver provisions require waiver applications 
to follow several broad guidelines. Waiver proposals must: 
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(1) . . . provide coverage to at least a comparable 
number of the state’s residents as would be provided 
absent the waiver; (2) . . . provide coverage and cost-
sharing protections against excessive out-of-pocket 
spending that are at least as affordable for the state’s 
residents as would be provided absent the waiver; (3) . . . 
provide coverage for the state’s residents that is at least 
as comprehensive for the state’s residents as would be 
provided absent the waiver; (4) . . . not increase the 
Federal [budget] deficit.285 
Section 1311(d)(3)(B) appears to be waivable under the ACA.286 In 
theory, so long as the waiver application otherwise complies with the 
requirements for a § 1332 waiver, a state could apply for a waiver from 
section 1311(d)(3)(B) enabling the state to enact a specific mandated 
benefit law without being required to defray the costs associated with 
the mandate.287 However, the innovation waiver approval remains 
somewhat unclear.288 Whether a state could construct a waiver proposal 
that meets the requirements of § 1332 and whether the federal 
government would grant such a waiver is uncertain.289 Moreover, 
comparable waiver processes in other federal health care programs are 
cumbersome and resource-intensive.290 Given the other available means 
of avoiding section 1311(d)(3)(B),291 the innovation waiver may not be 
an ideal way to avoid triggering section 1311(d)(3)(B). 
                                                          
285 Waivers for State Innovation, 80 Fed. Reg. 78131, 78132 (Dec. 16, 2015). 
286 42 U.S.C. § 13031 is included in Part 2 of Subtitle D of Title 1 of the Affordable 
Care Act, a section that is expressly included within the innovation waiver 
scheme. See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(2). 
287 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(2). 
288 See Ingram et al., supra note 284 (“It is unclear how the Section 1332 approval 
process will be any better [than the Medicaid Section 1115 waiver approval 
process]. In fact, it could be much worse . . . . Given the complexity and newness 
of Section 1332 waivers, combined with the fact that they must be approved by 
two agencies . . . instead of one, it seems unlikely that the approval process will 
be short.”). 
289 See id. (describing the “immense difficultly of fulfilling the ACA statutory 
requirements” for innovation waivers). 
290 See, e.g., id. (“States frequently comment on the frustrating, time consuming, and 
seemingly ‘corrupt and opaque’ process of the Medicaid Section 1115 waiver 
route.”). 
291 See supra text accompanying notes 277-79. 
374 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 326 
PART V. CONCLUSION 
As of the writing of this article, the ACA is still in effect. That being 
said, with President Donald Trump and Republican congressional 
leaders vowing to “repeal and replace” the ACA, it is once again facing 
significant political headwinds.292 The ACA’s future is uncertain. 
Likewise, whether the section of the ACA discussed in this article will 
remain in effect is unclear.293 What is clear, however, is that the 
insurance industry fought long and hard to obtain a federal curb on the 
proliferation of state mandated benefit laws.294 Whether the industry 
will allow this provision to be repealed without a fight remains to be 
seen. 
Whatever the fate of section 1311(d)(3)(B), it is now apparent that 
Congress stepped over the line that distinguishes congressional 
encouragement from commandeering when it enacted this requirement. 
Whether within the four corners of the ACA, a Republican health care 
reform plan, or some unrelated federal legislation, the ACA “defray the 
cost” approach must not be used as a model going forward. 
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